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Abstract 
Although researchers know a great deal about persuasive messages that encourage terrorism, 
they know far less about persuasive messages that denounce terrorism, and little about how these 
two sides come together. We propose a conceptualization that distinguishes a message’s support 
for an act from its support for the ideology underlying an act. Our prediction is tested using 
corpus-linguistic analysis of 250 counter-extremist messages written by Muslims and UK 
officials, and a comparison set of 250 Muslim extremist messages. Consistent with our 
prediction, Muslim extremist and Muslim counter-messages show disagreement on terrorist 
actions but agreement in ideological aspects, while UK officials’ counter-messages show 
disagreement with both Muslim extremists’ acts and ideology. Our findings suggest that counter-
messages should not be viewed as a homogenous group, and that being against violent 
extremism does not necessarily equate to having positive perceptions of Western values. 
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Differentiating Act from Ideology: Evidence from Messages For and Against Violent Extremism  
The rhetoric of those who seek to promote religiously or politically motivated violence 
has long been of interest to social scientists (Caton, 1987; Winter, 1993). Early research tended 
to conduct in-depth qualitative analyses of isolated aspects of texts, such as the use of fantasy in 
vision statements (Duffy, 2003) or imagery in predictions of apocalyptic times (Blazak, 2001). 
More recently, there has been a surge of quantitative content analyses of the arguments and 
‘persuasive levers’ that authors use to promote violence (Pennebaker & Chung, 2008; Prentice, 
Taylor, Rayson, Hoskins, & O’Loughlin, 2011; Salem, Reid, & Chen, 2008; Zhou, Reid, Qin, 
Chen, & Lai, 2005). These studies typically conceptualize messages as a series of persuasive acts 
that seek to change an audience’s beliefs, attitudes, or behavior (Perloff, 1993). They have also 
provided insights into both the construction and organization of messages that aim to promote 
ideological violence, and the personal and social levers that such messages address. 
The growth in studies of messages promoting violence has not been matched by a growth 
in studies examining ‘counter-messages’ that denounce such acts. There is some experimental 
research examining the extent to which attitude change is resistant to, or can be inoculated 
against, individual counter-arguments (Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2007; Tormala, Clarkson, & 
Petty, 2006). However, this experimental research focuses more on the contextual variables (e.g., 
source status) that mediate the influence of counter-messages than on the ideological or 
persuasive content of such messages. As a result, we know little about the different kinds of 
narratives and persuasive devices that are put forward to challenge messages promoting 
extremist violence. In the absence of an understanding of counter-messages, a definitive account 
of how pro- and counter-messages interrelate or ‘engage’ with one another is lacking. 
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Persuasion and Counter-Persuasion as Opposites 
One reason why so few studies of counter-messaging exist is the assumption that pro- and 
counter-messages are direct opposites of one another. Early research on persuasive 
communication has typically examined the impact of pro- and counter-messages that varied, for 
example, in message strength and target involvement (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). More 
recent work has continued this tradition by examining how the impact of pro- and counter-
messages are mediated by factors outside of the message itself (e.g., the majority vs. minority 
status of the source; Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2007). This ‘opposites’ conceptualization is 
endemic in the literature and appears in other research areas where persuasion might be seen to 
play a role. For example, theories of prejudice reduction seek to reduce violent or prejudiced 
outcomes between groups by moving individuals from a prejudiced to a tolerant mindset (Wright 
& Lubensky, 2008). In all of these examples, the underpinning conceptualization is one of a 
message changing a person’s position along a singular ‘attitude’ or ‘position’ dimension that 
encompasses thought and act. Indeed, in many of these studies, the ‘single-dimension’ 
assumption is made explicit by the fact that message impact is measured using a dependent 
variable that comprises a nominal (linear) measure (e.g., a Likert scale). 
Although the prevalence of this ‘opposites’ conceptualization may stem from the need to 
run controlled experiments, it is a view not confined to experimental research. In the domain of 
ideological violence, political commentaries center on the need to win “hearts and minds” by 
delegitimizing political violence and the actors who pursue it (Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010; 
Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009). For example, in his analysis of the ideological struggle 
between Al-Qaeda and Western governments, Payne (2009) found that the Al-Qaeda narrative is 
characterized by the concepts of Islamic utopia, an us-versus-them dichotomy, and jihad as a just 
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response. By contrast, government narratives were characterized by the concepts of undermining 
Al-Qaeda and building resilience and community cohesion through a sense of ‘Britishness.’ It is 
clear from such research that pro- and counter-messages are perceived most readily as 
ideological opposites with opposing views on how to act. From this perspective, arguing against 
extremist violence is a case of adopting the opposite position to that of those arguing for 
violence.  
Two or More Dimensions? 
The one-dimensional ‘opposites’ view is not a universal conceptualization of how pro- 
and counter-arguments relate to one another. The possibility of single issues being debated from 
multiple standpoints is implied in research that considers the different ways that authors’ frame 
their messages (Taylor & Donald, 2004, 2007; Wilson & Putnam, 1990) and the different 
persuasive tactics that are used to articulate those positions (Giebels & Taylor, 2009; Prentice et 
al., 2011). Implied in this research is a disconnection between the underlying position of the 
author (i.e., their ideology) and the kinds of acts that the author uses to argue for his or her 
position (i.e., their behavior). Similarly, in social psychological research, a number of authors 
have recognized that there is no necessary association between group identification and hostility. 
They have considered whether particular types of identification (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) 
or constructions of the group (Li & Brewer, 2004) impact on the likelihood of beliefs translating 
to action. Of particular relevance here is Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears’s (2008) recent 
social identity model of collective action. Based on a meta-analysis of 182 independent samples, 
this model shows that injustice beliefs are translated into collective action only when there exists 
the expectancy that action will result in the achievement of relevant goals. Although this work 
was based primarily on normative actions such as demonstrations, more recent work shows that 
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the opposite is true for more extreme non-normative actions (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011). In this 
research, non-normative actions are primarily driven by a sense of low efficacy, supporting 
popular beliefs that terrorism is fed by feelings of powerlessness. These studies show that beliefs 
and actions do not necessarily have a one-on-one relationship and that that act and ideology may 
be targeted independently by persuasive messages. 
The possibility that persuasive messages about the act may be distinct from messages 
about the underlying belief or ideology is consistent with social identity theory. Social identity 
theory postulates that people conceive themselves as belonging to multiple groups, each of which 
forms part of their identity based on membership of that group and enforcing boundaries with 
other groups (Tajfel, 1978; 1982). A person who identifies with two groups that have conflicting 
interests may experience tension over what aspects of their alternative group norms they choose 
to enact (Billig et al., 1988; Calhoun, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A person identifying as a 
member of one group may agree with certain aspects of the group’s ideology, but his or her other 
identities may lead to disagreement over the acts used by the group to pursue the ideology. A 
person not identifying with either the act or the ideology will experience no such agreement or 
tension. In the case of violent extremism, it is conceivable that those arguing for and against 
violence may both identify with aspects of their ideology that is driven by a Muslim identity, but 
they may distinguish amongst one another in terms of actions (Onishi & Murphy-Shigematsu, 
2003; Peek, 2005).  
Several theoretical accounts in the international relations literature lend support to the 
proposal that counter-extremists reject extremists’ actions but relate to their ideology. For 
example, at the center of the integrative theory of peace is the concept of a unity-based 
worldview (Danesh, 2006), something that both extremists and counter-extremists have been 
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found to hold in common (Payne, 2009). This suggests that there is some agreement along 
ideological lines, but a disagreement on the nature of peace and the manner in which to achieve it 
(Danesh, 2006). In a more fine-grained analysis of peace theory, Galtung (1967) argued that the 
conception of peace varies according to the civilizations involved. Peace in Arabic (i.e., 
“sala’am”) is conceptualized as justice, whereas peace in Western nations is conceptualized as 
the absence of violence. Galtung’s suggestion is that Muslim counter-extremists and Muslim 
violent extremists may hold a similar conception of peace, whereas Western counter-extremists 
will hold a different view. 
The Current Study 
The two conceptualizations of pro- and counter-messages described above represent 
fundamentally different perspectives on the rhetoric of political violence and terrorism. Given 
the arguments outlined above, we predict that the most applicable perspective on the relationship 
between extremist and counter-extremist messages is dependent upon the evaluations and 
affiliations of their authors. Specifically, we predict that Muslim-authored counter-messages will 
show disagreement in relation to the act but not contend the underpinning ideology, while UK 
officials’ messages will show disagreement in relation to act and ideology. We test these 
predictions by comparing the linguistic content of two separate corpora of counter-extremist 
messages to that of a corpus of extremist messages. 
Method 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Messages 
Data were corpora of 250 counter-extremist violence messages and 250 pro-extremist 
violence messages. These were downloaded from open-source websites accessible from the UK. 
We focused on online material to avoid confounding our analysis with the qualitative differences 
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that are known to exist across types of media (Gregory & Carroll, 1978). To be included in the 
corpora, a text had to conform to three criteria. First, a text had to be written in English, since the 
majority of material read by UK citizens targeted for violent extremism is written in English 
(Beutel, 2007). Second, the text had to explicitly advocate or denounce/condemn the use of 
extremist violence. We used this criterion to avoid confounding results with texts from authors 
who seek only to advocate a strict version of their beliefs. Third, the text had to be written in the 
first person, therefore avoiding possible third-hand recounting of narratives. All of the texts in 
the corpora were written between 1995 and 2010.  
Of the 250 counter-messages, 200 were Muslim-authored texts that combined instances 
of forum administrators responding to questions from guests (e.g., guidance from religious 
scholars) and posts on open discussion forums where the author’s response met our criteria. In all 
cases, the counter-message had to be preceded by a message supporting or questioning issues 
relating to extremist violence, and it had to be written by an author describing him or herself as 
Muslim. Combined these Muslim-authored counter-messages contained 119,713 words (M = 
598.4 words; SD = 731.6).  
The remaining 50 counter-messages were UK officials’ statements, collected from 
government websites or renowned news sites. In order to be included in this subset, the person 
responsible for the message had to be recognizable as a UK public figure that may be viewed as 
expressing the country’s ‘official’ position. The lesser number of these messages in comparison 
to the Muslim-authored texts was the result of pragmatic and methodological considerations. The 
availability of UK official counter-messages was far less than that of Muslim-authored messages. 
In addition, the UK officials’ statements were far longer than the average Muslim-authored 
counter-messages, such that increasing their number, or reducing the number of Muslim-
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authored counter-messages, would increase the disproportion in the number of words in each 
sample (as well as remove valuable data). The UK officials’ counter-messages contained a total 
of 89,164 words (M = 1785.1 words; SD = 1763.7).  
The corpus of 250 messages promoting extremist violence originated from the websites 
of well-known extremist groups and organizations (e.g., Al-Qa’ida), and unaffiliated websites 
and individual authors that advocate extremism but do not appear to have a particular group 
affiliation (e.g., Al-Fallujah forums). Data collection began with targeting the websites of known 
extremist organizations and individuals using, for example, the Home Office (2011) list of 
proscribed terrorist groups and organizations, followed by investigating links from such websites 
to other sites containing extreme material. In total, the corpus contained a total of 441,385 words 
(M = 1,814.0 words, SD = 2,327.1).  
Analyzing Semantic Content 
There are a number of methods available for analyzing the semantic content of text. 
Although qualitative methods such as critical discourse analysis are popular (Dixon, Archer, & 
Graham-Kevan, in press), recent advances in computerized text analysis has provided new, 
reliable ways to analyze and compare large collections of texts (Hancock, Woodworth, & Porter, 
in press; Olekalns, Brett, & Donohue, 2010; Taylor & Thomas, 2008). We exploit this emerging 
methodology by using a web-based corpus-linguistic package known as Wmatrix to analyze the 
semantic content of text.1 Wmatrix automatically annotates words and phrases according to their 
semantic meaning in three stages (Rayson, 2008). First, it uses a set of pre-defined templates to 
group together semantically meaningful chunks in texts such as phrasal verbs, idiomatic 
expressions, names, places, and organizations. Second, a part-of-speech tagger assigns major 
word class categories (e.g., noun, verb, adjective, adverb) to each word in the text. Third, a 
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semantic analysis system categorizes each word or phrase with a tag or label from a semantic 
field taxonomy consisting of 21 major domains (groups of semantically related words) and 232 
categories. The taxonomy is derived from lexicographic work and the semantic tagger relies on 
large manually created dictionaries for its knowledge of possible word and phrase meanings 
(Rayson, 2008). A key distinction from other similar automatic content analysis systems is that 
the tagger applies tags and then disambiguates them based on surrounding context to choose the 
most likely meaning in each case. 
Wmatrix then proceeds to count the words, phrases, and semantic tags found in the 
corpus. These frequencies may then be compared to a reference corpus (or another part of the 
dataset) that is examined in the same manner, in order to determine which words or semantic 
domains are ‘key.’ Here, ‘key’ refers to those aspects of the two corpora that are significantly 
different beyond what might be expected by chance. The extent to which a word or semantic 
concept is key is determined by comparing the relative frequencies of occurrence in the two 
corpora, thus taking account of differing corpus sizes, using a log-likelihood (LL) test (Dunning, 
1993; Rayson & Garside, 2000). Thus, the LL score acts as a ‘test’ of the significance of the 
frequency differences and allows different concepts to be compared in terms of their ‘keyness’. 
An examination of the log-likelihood results can operate at several levels. To get an 
overall picture of the semantic differences it is useful to compare the frequency of occurrence of 
underused and overused category (relative to the other corpora) differences across the corpora. 
To then get a richer understanding of what those differences reflect qualitatively, Wmatrix 
displays the results of the keyness analysis using word and semantic tag (i.e., a label representing 
the semantic category) ‘clouds’ (Rayson & Mariani, 2009). In these clouds, the elements are 
shown in alphabetical order, but the font size and type is proportional to the keyness of the 
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element. A larger font indicates a greater significance for a word or concept (i.e., its occurrence 
in one corpus was significantly more/less than its occurrence in the other corpora), while the 
valence of the relationship (i.e., more vs. less) is reflected by the standard font (over use) and 
italicized font (under use) of the key elements within the cloud. In the clouds featured in this 
paper, a large standard font relates to a high significance in overuse of an item in the extremist 
messages. A large italic font relates to a high significance in underuse in the extremist messages, 
and, therefore, a high significance in overuse in the counter message corpora with which it is 
being compared. 
To support the analysis of the clouds, Wmatrix allows further exploration through the use 
of concordance examples and collocate information. Concordance examples allow a researcher 
to view key word or concept elements within their immediate context, thus allowing for a clearer 
understanding of the way in which a term is being used. Collocation information will be used to 
show words that occur commonly within a specified span (in this case 5 words either side) of a 
key word or conceptual element, enabling one to build a picture of how a key term is being 
discussed and evaluated. All collocates are supplied along with their mutual information (MI) 
score, which is a measure of the strength of association between two terms, with a score of 3 or 
more typically considered significant (Rayson, 2008).  
If extremist messages and Muslim authored counter-messages share a common ideology, 
then we would expect the text clouds to show the extremist and Muslim counter-message authors 
overusing similar words and concepts. Likewise, if UK official messages have a differing 
ideological focus, then we would expect the text clouds to show that the UK officials overused a 
different set of words and concepts to the Muslim authors. Thus, we should find that the Muslim 
extremist messages and Muslim counter-messages show the most overlap in language use, and 
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the Muslim extremist and UK official counter-messages show the least. 
Results 
Overall Comparison 
Table 1 contains the results of the log-likelihood comparisons across all semantic 
categories for the extremist messages, Muslim authors’ counter-messages, and UK officials’ 
counter-messages. When the proportion by which a type of message contained a particular 
semantic category was significantly above or below that of the average for the other two message 
types, then it was recorded as being overused or underused for the category. Specifically, when 
the log-likelihood value of a particular semantic category was equal to or over 6.63 (p < .01), 
then it was recorded as being overused. Items below this value were recoded as being underused. 
As can be seen in Table 1, there was no significant difference in the overuse and underuse of 
semantic categories across the Muslim authors’ counter-messages and the extremist messages, 
χ2(1) < 1. By contrast, there was a significant difference in the overuse and underuse of semantic 
categories across the UK officials’ counter-messages and the extremist messages, χ2(1) = 4.29, p 
< .05, Φ = .07, 95% CI [.001, .132], and there was a significant difference in overuse and 
underuse of semantic categories across the two counter-message groups, χ2(1) = 9.28, p < .01, Φ 
= .10, 95% CI [.033, .163]. Thus, consistent with our prediction, the greatest semantic 
differences across the message types exists between the UK officials’ counter-messages 
compared to both sets of Muslim authors’ messages. 
Key Word Comparisons 
Figure 2 shows the key words that emerge when the extremist messages are compared to 
the Muslim authors’ counter-messages (top panel), and the UK officials’ counter-messages 
(bottom panel). The items displayed in bold font relate to overused items in the extremist 
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messages, while the items displayed in italic font relate to overused items in the counter-
messages. In both cases, a larger font relates to a greater difference between the corpora. 
Compared to the violent extremist texts, the Muslim author’s counter-messages (top panel) are 
characterized by a greater use of religious terminology, such as ‘Islam’ (LL = 552.03), ‘prophet’ 
(LL = 215.70), ‘Muslim’ (LL = 111.13), ‘Muslims’ (LL = 199.90) and ‘Qur’an’ (LL = 602.76). 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that counter-messages are founded on a religious 
ideology that is not present in extremist messages. As can be seen from the bottom panel of 
Figure 2, the extremist-messages also significantly emphasize religion compared to the UK 
officials, with words such as ‘Allah’ (LL = 1449.53), ‘Islam’ (LL = 95.88), ‘Islamic’ (LL = 
176.91) and ‘Muslims’ (LL = 111.34) all overrepresented in their use. Thus, use of language 
referring to religion and religious ideology is common to both the extremist and Muslim counter-
messages, but not the UK officials’ messages. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting observations from Figure 2 is the presence of words 
in the Muslim counter-messages that one might traditionally associate with extremist literature. 
Terms such as ‘violence’ (LL = 146.43), ‘killing’ (LL = 118.48) and ‘apostasy’ (LL = 120.80) all 
appear significantly more often in the Muslim authors’ counter-messages than their extremist 
counterparts. To determine whether or not, in line with our prediction, these stereotypically 
extremist terms were occurring in the counter-messages because the authors are denouncing the 
acts, the collocates of “violence,” “killing” and “apostasy” were investigated. This collocate 
investigation resulted in some expected results, such as “violence” strongly associating with the 
word “unnecessary” (MI = 9.18), and “killing” strongly associating with the words “forbade” 
(MI = 8.15), “prohibition” (MI = 7.28), “stop” (MI = 6.55), and “sin” (MI = 5.58). However, this 
was not always the case, with such words also occurring alongside unexpected associations, such 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 14 
as “killing” strongly associating with the word “permit” (MI = 7.15), and “apostasy” strongly 
associating with the word “punishment” (MI = 7.94).  
To examine these conflicting collocates further, the concordances of examples of these 
terms were examined. Figure 3 shows concordance examples of the word “violence” in the 
Muslim authors’ counter-extremist messages. If we view extensions of these concordances, they 
suggest that Muslim counter-extremists disagree with the violence used by all nations, not just 
the extremists within their own nations. For example, “If some Islamic groups are involved in 
violence and are considered extremist, there are also other groups and even nations that are 
known for committing acts of violence, such as Israel, or Hindu groups in India. Violence has no 
nationality; it exists everywhere. The list of individuals, groups, or even nations that use violence 
to attain political aims is quite long.” In addition, these authors also appear to accept the 
ideological position that violence is permitted in certain circumstances though perhaps differ in 
what circumstances such action would be permitted (i.e., only in self-defense and only as a last 
resort). For example,	  “…it is not right to resort to violence and force. Muslims should only use 
force when they are compelled to, and as a last resort. They should not initiate fighting, unless 
there is some cause on the part of the kaafirs, such as their fighting the Muslims.” 
So what does characterize the UK officials’ messages? An examination of the bottom 
panel in Figure 2 suggests that officials’ messages (in italics) are instead characterized by 
language that seeks to build a sense of commonality. For example, there is highly significant 
overuse of words suggesting collective engagement, such as “we” (LL = 597.73), “community” 
(LL = 134.45) and “communities” (LL = 112.53), in the UK officials’ statements compared to the 
extremist messages. (Interestingly, this same collective good is also emphasized in extremist 
messages, as evidenced by the fact that they contain a high usage of “we” when compared to the 
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Muslim authors’ counter-messages [LL = 106.41, see top panel]). The emphasis on commonality 
in the UK officials’ messages is made particularly apparent when the collocates of value related 
terms are examined. For example, collocates of the term “values” (LL = 146.79), a key 
component of ideology that is overused in the UK officials’ counter-messages, include “shared” 
(MI = 6.79), “share” (MI = 6.58) and “common” (MI = 6.31). Similarly, the highest collocate of 
“community” (LL = 134.45) is “cohesion” (MI = 8.20), and amongst collocates of 
“communities” (LL = 122.53) are “across” (MI = 5.47) and “all” (MI = 4.25). This kind of 
language use is not as prominent in the Muslim authors’ counter-messages. Indeed, although 
“community” (LL = 57.78) is present as a key word in Muslim authors’ counter-messages, this is 
used to refer to an already established “Muslim” (MI = 6.14) community, rather than needing to 
create one. 
Key Concept Comparisons 
Figure 4 shows the key concept clouds for both a comparison of the extremist messages 
to the Muslim authors’ counter-messages (top panel) and the extremist messages compared to the 
UK officials’ counter-messages (bottom panel). Both Muslim authors’ counter-messages and 
extremist messages appear concerned with religion, as expressed by concepts such as religion 
and the supernatural (counter-messages, LL = 584.54; extremist-messages, LL = 1650.22), ethics, 
as expressed by concepts such as ethical and unethical (LL = 91.53 and 65.15), language, as 
expressed by the concept language, speech and grammar (LL = 220.39 and LL = 39.68) and 
death, as expressed by the concept dead (LL = 67.89 and LL = 125.35). 
There is also evidence of common use of polarized language, as expressed through the 
use of semantic pair concepts. For example, the Muslim counter-messages contain juxtapositions 
such as: ‘Allowed’ (LL = 110.29) and ‘Not allowed’ (LL = 171.58), ‘Alive’ (LL = 27.59) and 
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‘Dead’ (LL = 67.89), ‘Calm’ (LL = 280.93) and ‘Violent/Angry’ (LL = 123.11), and ‘Lawful’ 
(LL = 370.62) and ‘Crime’ (LL = 278.11). This kind of presentation is equally prominent in the 
extremist messages: ‘Alive’ (LL = 26.69) and ‘Dead’ (LL = 125.35), ‘In power’ (LL = 161.05) 
and ‘No power’ (LL = 39.85), ‘Respected’ (LL = 47.20) and ‘No respect’ (LL = 66.25), 
‘Religion’ (LL = 1650.22) and ‘Non-religious’ (LL = 152.26).   
Despite these ideological similarities, Muslim counter-message authors in our corpus 
retain their dislike of terrorist actions and appear to use a strategy of religious clarification 
(attempting to offer a more peaceful interpretation of the Qur’an and other Islamic texts) in 
which to dissuade others from engaging in such activities. This strategy is captured in many of 
the concepts to some degree. For example, it is reflected in Comparing: Usual (LL = 39.69) due 
to reference to “accepted” religious “norms" and “basic” principles, Likely (LL = 68.99) due to 
terms relating to the “clarification” of the Islamic religion, and Strong obligation or necessity (LL 
= 35.18), due to terms that espouse the obligations of the Muslim community in relation to the 
protection of innocents. With regard to the Violent/Angry (LL = 123.11) concept, this strategy 
arises due to authors quoting seemingly violent extracts from the Qur’an and making mention of 
the fact that Islam does not condone violence against innocents, only against oppressors. While 
the authors of Muslim counter-messages at times sympathize with the anger felt by their Muslim 
audience, they ask that where possible it be directed in alternative ways, for example, through 
spoken demonstration and protest (hence the presence of the concept “Linguistic Actions, States 
and Processes; Communication” – LL = 99.41). 
In terms of the British Official counter messages (italic items, bottom panel, Figure 4), 
the contrastive concepts feature found in the Muslim authored counter-messages is less present. 
The lack of contrasting concepts suggests that UK officials do not represent the world from the 
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same contrastive, ideological perspective as found in both the Muslim counter-messages, and the 
extremist messages. There are some exceptions, with UK Official counter-messages showing 
overuse of the same semantic categories as the Muslim authored counter-messages on categories 
including “Law and order” (LL = 206.47 compared with LL = 37.81), “Lawful” (LL = 32.40 
compared with LL = 370.62), and “Crime” (LL = 885.25 compared with LL = 278.11). However, 
an examination of concordance examples around these topics reveals a different perspective 
between the counter-message types on what constitutes crime and law and order. For example, 
concordances of the “Crime” concept in the Muslim authored counter-messages include “Islam 
believes in stopping injustice, oppression and any threat to peace or freedom. In many instances, 
there is no way to guarantee these goals without arms and fighting”, and “It’s about time we 
denounced terrorism publicly. This doesn’t discredit the legitimate Jihads being fought to ease 
the oppression of Muslims, such as those in Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya”, while for the UK 
officials includes “The danger is that by positing a single source of terrorism - a global jihad - 
and opposing it with a single global response American-backed force we will simply fulfill our 
own prophecy”. Such instances go to show, for example, that for Muslim authors, the concept of 
‘jihad’ is not criminal and has a part to play in the justice system, while for British officials the 
opposite is true. Further, there are only 9 collocates of “terrorism” in the Muslim authored 
counter messages, all of which do not so much seek to vilify terrorism as define it, the top 
collocate being “definition” (MI = 8.58). None of the collocates speak to preventing, fighting or 
tackling terrorism. In contrast, there are over 50 collocates of “terrorism” in the British official 
counter-messages, the top of which is “crime” (MI = 10.25), with the majority of others 
suggesting terrorism is a threat that needs to be acted upon, such as “fight” (MI = 5.63), “tackle” 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 18 
(MI = 5.68) and “preventing” (MI = 5.48). The collocates therefore provide further evidence of 
differing understandings of “terrorism” between the counter-message types. 
Discussion 
A novel text analysis methodology was used to test the prediction that conflict over a 
high-stakes issue such as violent extremism is best captured through a multidimensional 
conceptualization that distinguishes act from ideology. Overall, we found that the content of 
Muslim authored extremist- and counter-extremist messages shared ideological content but 
distinct views on the acts used to achieve such goals. This was true both in the overall analysis of 
the concept frequencies across the three corpora, and when we exposed the qualitative 
differences among the corpora. Compared to the UK officials’ counter-messages, the Muslim 
authors’ counter-messages showed (at both the word and concept level) similar use of religious 
terminology, similar use of stereotypical extremist language, and equivalent ways of using 
‘contrastive’ concepts (Prentice, Rayson, & Taylor, in press) when discussing religion, ethics, 
and language. These similarities give some evidence of a shared value system between Muslim 
extremist and counter-extremist authors (Galtung, 1967). That is, both message types are 
characterized by similar presentation of semantics related to ideology that is in contrast to UK 
officials’ statements. Despite similarities in expression at the ideological level between Muslim 
extremist and counter messages, both sets of counter-messages were similar when describing the 
actions of extremist violence. The exception being that, whilst Muslim counter-message authors 
are against violent acts per se, they are not against the use of violence in theory, in particular 
circumstances, as defined in Islamic ideology (Khān, 2002). This was affirmed by our finding of 
conflicting permissive/non-permissive collocates of stereotypically extremist language items, 
coupled with the concordances of the term “violence” in the Muslim authored counter messages. 
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A second difference between the UK officials’ and Muslim texts is the conception of law 
and order (which would provide some evidence of a shared value system). If “terrorism” is to be 
regarded here as religious warfare, then for the Muslim authored counter messages, not all forms 
of “terrorism” are regarded as criminal, some are viewed as acceptable to combat injustice 
(indeed, a study by Mascini, 2006, has found sympathizers for violent jihad amongst the Muslim 
community). In this way, justice appears intrinsically linked to religion. By contrast, within the 
UK officials’ messages, “terrorism” in this sense is equivalent to crime. This difference may 
arguably have something to do with the separation of religion from state in Western cultures (see 
Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009), demonstrating the ideological difference between UK 
officials and Muslim authors’ counter-extremist messages. In addition, further evidence of their 
ideological difference from one another comes from the fact that UK officials have to expressly 
use group orientation terminology to gain a sense of commonality and build shared values with 
the target British Muslim audience, which is something Muslim counter-message authors do not 
do. Arguably they do not have to engage in this strategy because they already intrinsically share 
values with the audience. 
A third aspect of the results is the significant references to group orientation in both 
extremist-messages and UK officials’ counter-messages.  This rhetoric may represent an attempt 
to highlight a battle to define the in-group – a battle that Muslim authored counter-messages do 
not appear to engage. This again raises the question of influence. It may be, for example, that 
Muslim authors’ counter-messages have more power to influence than the other message types 
featured in this paper because the message source shares a commonality with the target audience 
and may appear more credible (cf. Giebels & Taylor, 2009). In line with our theoretical 
expectations, then, there is no apparent similarity in ideology from the above comparison, but 
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there are similarities in arguments and audience engagement strategies. These similarities result 
in the surprising finding of a large overlap between the word use of extremists and UK officials, 
which is contrary to both general expectations and previous literature in the field of counter-
terrorism (e.g., Payne, 2009). This literature suggests that their content would be distinctly 
different. However, just because two parties use the same language does not mean that they use 
such language to say the same thing. 
Although the linguistic content of the different message types supported our predictions 
on the whole, there was one exception. Our framework (Figure 1) suggests that the extremist 
messages and UK officials’ counter-messages would be the most different, because the authors 
differ on both agreement with terrorist acts and ideological affiliation. However, surprisingly, 
and contrary to what previous research and popular opinion would expect, the Muslim and UK 
official’s counter-messages show the greatest dissimilarity. It is difficult to provide a definitive 
explanation of this finding. One possibility, however, relates to the fact that Muslim counter-
message authors may be deliberately distancing themselves from Western ideological values so 
as to avoid being dismissed as such in the responses of extremist authors. In this sense they are 
adopting in their communication a social identity that is more extreme than that adopted by those 
advocating an extremist position, in order to make clear the focus of their argument. In order to 
be more effective then, UK officials would need to tailor their counter narrative to the audience 
in question, adopting more of the characteristics of Muslim counter-extremist messages (cf. 
Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko, & McCauley, 2010).  
The findings of this study provided linguistic evidence to suggest that being against 
extremist violence and encouraging tolerance of non-Muslims does not equate to being positive 
towards or assimilating with Western values (see Sommerlad & Berry, 1970, on the challenges 
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of assimilation between different ethnic groups). More importantly, the findings suggested that 
many authors of counter-messages presented similar, arguably stricter interpretations of their 
religion than those advocating violence. This distinction between act and ideology stands in 
contrast to the inculpatory framing of extremism that is sometimes presented by official 
authorities and the popular media (e.g., “They are terrorists pure and simple”, Blair, 2001). It 
also suggests that any theory of how conflict over a position plays out must encapsulate the 
multi-dimensional nature of positions. 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 22 
References 
Beutel, A. J. (2007). Radicalization and homegrown terrorism in Western Muslim communities: 
Lessons learned for America. Report for the Minaret of Freedom Institute. Available at: 
http://www.minaret.org/MPAC%20Backgrounder.pdf	  
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D., & Radley, A. (1988). Ideological 
dilemmas: A social psychology of everyday thinking. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage 
Publications. 
Blair, T. (2001). Statement after the US and British military target in Afghanistan. Retrieved 
March 16, 2010, from http://www.putlearningfirst.com/language/20rhet/blair.html	  
Blazak, R. (2001). White boys to terrorist men: Target recruitment of Nazi skinheads. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 44, 982-1000. 	  
Caton, S. C. (1987).  Power persuasion, and language: A critique of the segmentary model in the 
Middle East. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19, 77-102. 
Calhoun, C. J. (1994). Social theory and the politics of identity. Massachusetts; Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Chowdhury, A., & Krebs, R. R. (2010). Talking about terror: Counterterrorist campaigns and the 
logic of representation. European Journal of International Relations, 16, 125-150.  
Danesh, H. B. (2006). Towards an integrative theory of peace education. Journal of Peace 
Education, 3, 55-78. 
Dixon, L., Archer, J., & Graham-Kevan, N. (in press). Perpetrators programmes for partner 
violence: Are they based on ideology or evidence? Legal and Criminological Psychology. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2011.02029.x 
 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 23 
Duffy, M. E. (2003). Web of hate: A fantasy theme analysis of the rhetorical vision of hate 
groups online. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 27, 291-312. 
Dunning, T. (1993). Accurate methods for the statistics of surprise and coincidence. 
Computational Linguistics, 19, 61-74. 
Galtung, J. (1967). Theories of peace keeping: A synthetic approach to peace keeping. 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway.  
Giebels, E., & Taylor, P. J. (2009). Interaction patterns in crisis negotiations: Persuasive 
arguments and cultural differences. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 5-19. 
Gregory, M., & Carroll, S. (1978). Language and situation: Language varieties and their social 
contexts. London: Routledge. 
Halafoff, A., & Wright-Neville, D. (2009). A missing peace? The role of religious actors in 
countering terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32, 921-932. 
Hancock, J. T., Woodworth, M. T., & Porter, S. (in press). Hungary like a wolf: A word-pattern 
analysis of the language of psychopaths. Legal and Criminological Psychology. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2011.02025.x 
Home Office (2011). Proscribed terrorist groups or organizations. Retrieved March 30, 2011, 
from: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-
groups/	  
Khan, V. (2002). The true jihad: the concepts of peace, tolerance, and non-violence in Islam. 
Goodword: New Delhi. 
Leuprecht, C., Hataley, T., Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2010). Containing the narrative: 
Strategy and tactics in countering the storyline of global jihad. Journal of Policing, 
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 5, 42-57. 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 24 
Li, Q., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). What does it mean to be an American? Patriotism, nationalism 
and American identity after 9/11. Political Psychology, 25, 727-739.	  
Mascini, P. (2006). Can the violent jihad do without sympathizers? Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 29, 343-357. 
Martin, R., Hewstone, M., & Martin, P. Y. (2007). Majority versus minority influence: The role 
of message processing in determining resistance to counter-persuasion. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 38, 16-34. 
Olekalns, M., Brett, J., & Donohue, W. A. (2010). Words are all I have: Linguistic cues as 
predictors of settlement in divorce mediation. Negotiation and Conflict Management 
Research, 3, 145-168. 
Onishi, J. A., & Murphy-Shigematsu, J. S. (2003). Identity narratives of Muslim foreign workers 
in Japan. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 13, 224-239.  
Payne, K. (2009). Winning the battle of ideas: Propaganda, ideology, and terror. Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 32, 109-128. 
Peek, L. (2005). Becoming Muslim: The development of a religious identity. Sociology of 
Religion, 66, 215-242.  
Pennebaker, J. W., & Chung, C. K. (2008). Computerized text analysis of al-Qaeda statements. 
In K. Krippendorff, & M. Bock (Eds.), A content analysis reader (pp. 453–466). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Perloff, R. M. (1993). The dynamics of persuasion. Hillsdale, NJ: Erbaum. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by 
enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37, 1915-1926. 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 25 
Prentice, S., Rayson, P., & Taylor, P. J. (in press). The language of Islamic extremism: Towards 
an automated identification of beliefs, motivations and justifications. International 
Journal of Corpus Linguistics. 
Prentice, S., Taylor, P. J., Rayson, P., Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2011). Analyzing the 
semantic content and persuasive composition of extremist media: A case study of texts 
produced during the Gaza conflict. Information Systems Frontiers, 13, 61-73. 
Rayson, P. (2008). From key words to key semantic domains. International Journal of Corpus 
Linguistics, 13, 519-549. 
Rayson, P., & Garside, R. (2000). Comparing corpora using frequency profiling. In Kilgarriff, A. 
(Ed.), Proceedings of the Workshop on Comparing Corpora (vol. 9). Stroudsburg, PA: 
Association for Computational Lingusitics. 
Rayson, P., & Mariani, J. (2009). Visualizing corpus linguistics. In M. Mahlberg, V. Gonzales-
Diaz, & C. Smith (Eds.), Proceedings of the Corpus Linguistics Conference 2009 (Article 
#426). Available for download at: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/publications/cl2009/ 
Salem, A., Reid, E., & Chen, H. (2008). Multimedia content coding and analysis: Unravelling 
the content of Jihadi extremist groups’ videos. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 
605-626. 
Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind 
versus constructive patriotism. Political Psychology, 20, 151-174.	  
Sommerlad, E. A., & Berry, J. W. (1970). The role of identification in distinguishing between 
attitudes towards assimilation and integration of a minority racial group. Human 
Relations, 23, 23-29. 
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation between social groups. London; New York: Academic Press.  
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 26 
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & 
S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, 
CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 
1-39. 
Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., & Singh, P. (2011). Explaining radical 
group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and nonnormative 
collective action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 129-148. 
Taylor, P. J., & Donald, I. J. (2004). The structure of communication behavior in simulated and 
actual crisis negotiations. Human Communication Research, 30, 443-478. 
Taylor, P. J., & Donald, I. J. (2007). Testing the relationship between local cue-response patterns 
and global dimensions of communication behavior. British Journal of Social Psychology, 
46, 273-298. 
Taylor, P. J., & Thomas, S. (2008). Linguistic style matching and negotiation outcome. 
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1, 263-281. 
Tormala, Z. L., Clarkson, J. J., & Petty, R. E. (2006). Resisting persuasion by the skin of one’s 
teeth: The hidden success of resisted persuasive messages. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 91, 423-435.  
Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Towards an integrative social identity 
model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological 
perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 504-535. 
Wilson, S. R., & Putnam, L. L. (1990). Interaction goals in negotiation. In J. Anderson (Ed.), 
Communication Yearbook 13 (pp. 374-406). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 27 
Winter, D. G. (1993). Power, affiliation, and war: Three tests of a motivational model. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 532-545. 
Wright, S. C., & Lubensky, M. (2008). The struggle for social equality: Collective actions vs. 
prejudice reduction. In S. Demoulin, J. P. Leyens, & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Intergroup 
misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities (pp. 291-310). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Zhou, Y., Reid, E., Qin, J., Chen, H., & Lai, G. (2005). US domestic extremist groups on the 
Web: Link and content analysis. Intelligent Systems, IEEE, 20, 44-51.	  
 
Extremist and Counter-Extremist Language 28 
Footnotes 
1 Visit: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ for details of this software, including online access. 
2 Visit: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/usas/ for details of the UCREL semantic analysis system. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Key word differences between extremist messages and Muslim authors’ counter-
messages (top panel) and extremist and UK officials’ counter-messages (bottom panel). 
Italic font indicates greater occurrence in counter-messages. Bold font equals greater 
occurrence in extremist messages. 
Figure 2. Concordance examples of “violence” in the Muslim authors’ counter-messages 
Figure 3. Key concept differences between extremist-messages and Muslim authors’ counter-
messages (top panel) and UK officials’ counter-messages (bottom panel). Italic font 
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Table 1. Number of total semantic categories over/underused in each corpus 
 
 Message Type 




No. of categories overused 212 197 244 
No. of categories underused 267 282 235 
 
 
